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This study investigates the social exchange process between employees and 
employers and whether the role of trust (employee generalized trust and employee 
trust in supervisor) contributes to the social exchange theory explanation of the 
employer inducement – employee reciprocation process.   
In a previous study where social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity 
were applied to investigate employer – employee social exchange relationship, it was 
found that employee expectation of inducements from their employer was a stronger 
predictor of their contribution obligation than employee perception of employer 
inducements. In order to gain a better understanding on the employer inducement – 
employee reciprocation process, two studies were carried out in the thesis.  Study 1, 
as a continuation of the previous study, modified and re-examined the exchange 
model, and furthermore, examined the impact of employee perceived employer 
inducement on employee expectation and the impact of employer perceived employee 
performance on employer expectation.  Study 2, as an extension of the previous study, 
involved the role of trust into the exchange process.  Both dispositional trust 
(generalized trust) and interpersonal trust (trust in supervisor) were examined in their 
respective influence on the employer inducement – employee contribution process.      
Employee contribution obligation (task performance obligation, contextual 
performance obligation, and intent to leave)  
In Study 1, whether one party’s perceived inducement/performance from the 
other party affects the other party’s expectation, can reveal whether each party’s 
perceived contribution has indirect effect on this party’s contribution obligation 
through impacting this party’s own expectation.   
In Study 2, whether trust in supervisor is related to employee contribution 
 vi
obligation and employee perceived employer inducement, can tell the role of 
interpersonal trust in the social exchange. And the extent to which generalized trust is 
related to its proposed consequences (employee perception, expectation, trust, and 
contribution obligation) can answer whether dispositional trust also has impact on the 
social exchange process.   
 
 The data were collected through a survey from 9 companies in Ningbo, China.  
The sample consists of 394 employees and 46 supervisors from 46 working groups 
varying on their functions or occupational categories.  The purpose of collecting data 
from diverse sample of supervisors (representatives of employers in this study) and 
employees is to achieve the generalizability and robustness of research findings, 
which is absent in the previous study with nurses in hospitals as surveyed subjects.   
  
  The results of Study 1 confirmed the indirect effect of employee perception of 
employer inducement on employee contribution obligation through employee 
expectation, however, did not confirm the corresponding relationship on employers’ 
side.  Employer perception of employee performance was not found to have indirect 
impact on employer inducement obligation through employer expectation.   
 The results of Study 2 confirmed the role of trust in supervisor in social 
exchange especially when there are more uncertainties: trust in supervisor was 
strongly influenced by employee perceived employer inducement and influenced 
employee contextual obligation, while its influence on employee task obligation was 
not significant.  Employee intent to leave was also found to be affected by trust in 
supervisor.  As to employee generalized trust, it was significantly associated with 
employee perception, expectation, trust, and performance obligation.  The only 
 vii
exception is its relationship with intent to leave, which was not supported by the 
current study.    
 
 Overall, this study enriches our understanding on the employer – employee 
exchange in organization by viewing the possible indirect path through expectation, 
and reveals the connections between social exchange and norm of reciprocity through 
concrete path models.  It further focuses on the employer inducement – employee 
contribution process, from employee perspective, and shows the roles of both 
dispositional trust and interpersonal trust in the social exchange/reciprocity process.   
Regarding managerial implication, this study suggests that employee perception 
of employer inducement would be more effective inducement when it matches 
employee expectation.  Organizations should also take trust into account to ensure 








In this section, the central theoretical principles underlying Study 1 and Study 2 
are briefly introduced.  Research questions regarding the two studies are suggested.  
 
1.1 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR STUDY ONE 
Social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity have long been discussed in 
exploring the exchange relationship between employers and employees. Social 
exchange refers to voluntary action that is motivated by the expectation of return 
benefits (Blau, 1964).  The norm of reciprocity stipulates that “people should help 
those who have helped them” (Gouldner, 1960: 171) and indicates that a person who 
has been helped by someone else bears a normative obligation to repay the favor.  
These two principles work interdependently in the exchange process.   
If the norm of reciprocity is not applied by the beneficiary, social exchange will 
be suspended since the contributing party will not continue their contribution which is 
receiving no returns.  If the norm of reciprocity is not believed by either party, social 
exchange will not start at all since both parties do not expect returns from the other 
and have no motivation to offer benefits.  If the norm of reciprocity is not believed by 
any one party, social exchange will finally break down since the suspecting party 
does not expect reciprocation and has no motivation to contribute.     
On the other hand, putting social exchange aside, the norm of reciprocity alone 





Referring to Gouldner (1960) and Blau’s (1964) statements, it can be confirmed 
that both theories are complementary to each other. 
Although Gouldner (1960) defined the norm of reciprocity as “people should 
help those who have helped them”, he stated: 
The norm of reciprocity holds that people should help those who help them and, 
therefore, those whom you have helped have an obligation to help you.  The 
conclusion is clear: if you want to be helped by others you must help them… (p.173) 
 
It appears that the motivational basis for reciprocating involves instrumentalist 
calculations which are not as simple as “reciprocity” only.  People help those who 
have helped them not just because of inner compliance to the norm of reciprocity. 
Their helping behaviors are prompted by the returns which they hope to receive in the 
future, and their helping behaviors are directed towards those from whom they may 
receive help (they may consider those who previously ever helped out to be more 
likely to offer help next time).  This implies that the norm of reciprocity has 
underlying principles close to those of social exchange theory. 
Similarly, although social exchange theory suggests that the motivation for one 
party to help another is the desire to receive some benefit from that party in return, 
Blau (1964: 89) also argued that the contribution from one party gives rise to the 
obligation of the other party to provide a benefit in return: “An individual who 
supplies rewarding services to another obligates him.  To discharge this obligation, 
the second must furnish benefits to the first in turn.” In a more recent discussion of 
the social exchange theory, Blau (1994: 154) explained, “a person who benefits from 
an association is under an obligation to reciprocate…The self-imposed obligation to 
reciprocate is sustained by interest in continuing to obtain the benefit.”  These 
complementary explanations emphasize the necessity of reciprocation – a principle 




  When social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity are applied to 
employment environment, they can together explain the employer – employee 
exchange relationship.  Employer inducement to employees is based on the 
contribution they expect from employees.  The extent to which employees contribute 
is based on the reward they expect from employers.  Nevertheless, this can be 
sustained only when both parties apply the norm of reciprocity and believe that the 
other party will also observe the norm of reciprocity.   
 
  There is another underlying principle for both social exchange theory and the 
norm of reciprocity: it is necessary for both parties to recognize or perceive the 
benefit provided by the opposite party in the relationship.  Without this recognition 
process, the beneficiary party may not understand what the other party has done and 
thus will not make corresponding reciprocation even he/she is very willing to return 
the favors from others.  Without this process, the contributing party may not continue 
his/her beneficial behaviors since he/she does not realize that he/she has received the 
return from the opposite party.  The importance for each party to perceive the benefits 
received from the opposite party was noted by Blau (1960: 89-90), “If both 
individuals value what they receive from the other, both are prone to supply more of 
their own services to provide incentives for the other to increase his supply and to 
avoid becoming indebted to him.” 
The theoretical principles discussed in the preceding paragraphs have often 
been examined separately in the employer – employee exchange relationship, each 
focusing on a different point of view in explaining the exchange relationship.  But 
considering the interdependence among these principles, it is meaningful to integrate 

















































In Figure 1, the norm of reciprocity explains relationship 1a (employee 
perception of employer inducement Æ employee obligation ) and relationship 1b 
(employer perception of employee performance Æ employer obligation); social 
exchange theory explains relationship 2a (employee expectation Æ employee 
obligation) and relationship 2b (employer expectation Æ employer obligation); and 
the underlying recognition/perceiving process explains relationship 3a (employee 
obligation Æ employer perception of employee performance) and relationship 3b 
(employer obligation Æ employee perception of employer inducement). 
For the ease of reading, short terms for the six variables critical in the employer 
– employee exchange process are often used across this thesis.  Detailed explanations 
for each term are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Variables in the Exchange Model 
 
Term used Explanation 
Employer expectation Employers’ belief of future contribution from their 
subordinate employees 
Employee expectation Employees’ belief of future inducement from their 
employers 
Employer obligation Employers’ obligation to provide inducement to their 
subordinate employees 
Employee obligation Employees’ obligation to make contribution to their 
employers 
Employee perception of 
employer inducement  
Employers’ inducement perceived by their subordinate 
employees 
Employer perception of 
employee performance  
Employees’ contribution perceived by their employers 
 
The exchange model in Figure 1 has been tested in Barnard’s (2001) study, 
with results illustrated in Figure 2.  It was found that employee perception of 
employer inducement and employee expectation together accounted for only a small 
portion of variance in employee obligation (18%), and employee expectation was a 




perception of employer inducement (β = .06, p < .05).  For employer obligation, 42% 
of the variance was explained by employer expectation (β = .64, p < .01) and 
employer perception of employee performance (β = .07, p < .01).  Also, a significant 
relationship between employee obligation and employer perception of employee 
performance was also found. 
It seems that social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity have certain 
effect in explaining the motivation of each party’s contribution to the other party in 
the employer – employee relationship, although the complete exchange process still 
need exploration because of the slippage in the recognition process between employer 
obligation and employee perception of employer inducement (β = .01, p > .05), and 
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df = 2828 
chi2/df = 2.95 
prob = .00 
 
TLI = .93 
CFI = .94 
RMSEA = .03.1
 .0e obligation is .18, on 




This research intends to answer two research questions based on the above 
results.  First, regarding the mixed findings in Barnard’s (2001) study, it is interesting 
to examine whether the exchange model are replicable on a different sample.  Study 1 
will therefore be designed to answer this question and a modified exchange model 
will be developed.  Second, concerning the small portion of variance explained on 
employee obligation, individual employees’ attitude and dispositional characteristics 
key to the reciprocal social exchange process need to be studied for their possible 
complementary roles to the social exchange/norm of reciprocity explanation.  Study 2 
(next section) will thus be designed and an alternative model will be built up on the 
basis of the modified exchange model in Study 1.  
 
1.2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR STUDY TWO 
Further studying on the social exchange theory reveals that several 
characteristics of social exchange should not be ignored when examining the 
employer – employee exchange relationship.   
First, unlike in economic exchange where exchange elements have been 
negotiated explicitly by employers and employees, the exchange elements expected in 
social exchange process include unspecified obligation which is beyond the task/duty 
description specified for each party in the relationship and exhibits a wider range of 
appropriate behaviors.  The exchange of benefits thus involves uncertainty and 
ambiguity.  One is not sure whether his/her contribution is desired by the other party 
and whether it will be reciprocated with desirable rewards.  In this case, it was 
suggested that how individuals interpret information regarding exchange may have a 
greater impact on their attitudes and behaviors than what the message that the 




Second, in the previous study, the norm of reciprocity was regarded as a 
principle essentially important for the continuation of the social exchange process.  
Although the norm of reciprocity is assumed by Gouldner (1960: 171) to be universal 
and to be the norm initializing, guiding and stabilizing the social exchange process, 
we have to admit it is not enforced/guaranteed and will not always be observed, 
especially in social exchange where human beings are admitted by Blau (1964: 92) to 
be self-interested – meaning that individuals from both parties in a relationship strive 
to maximize individual utility and minimize risks associated with their connections.  
If the benefit one received is valued, the recipient will find it worthwhile to 
reciprocate in order to induce the donor to supply the desirable benefit.  On the 
contrary, when the received benefit is not useful, one may consider the reciprocation 
to be not worthwhile.  Based on this assumption, Blau (1964: 92) even acknowledged 
that the extent to which employees will contribute to organizations should depend on 
the “existential conditions of exchange, not in the norm of reciprocity”.   
Third, as previously stated on the third page of this thesis, the continuous 
exchange between employer and employee “can be sustained only when both parties 
apply the norm of reciprocity and believe that the other party will also observe the 
norm of reciprocity”.  Much attention has been paid on the former condition, but the 
latter one is as important as the former.  Whether a party believes or not that the other 
party will observe the norm of reciprocity is not totally dependent on the actual 
application of the reciprocity by the other party but partly dependent on this party’s 
own characteristic. 
From above statement we can find that social exchange between employer and 
employee is a dynamic form of exchange.  The exchange elements are unspecified.  




tendency to believe is as important as the fact of reciprocation.  It seems the social 
exchange between employer and employee can not be simply attributed to 
inducement – contribution such quid-pro-quo exchange.  Whether one party will 
initiate the exchange process by providing a favor to the opposite party and whether 
the opposite party will provide a benefit in return depends on the personal 
characteristics of each party and the nature of the relationship between them.   In the 
dynamics of the social exchange process, the elements of exchange may evolve with 
exchange partners’ individual difference and the dyadic relationship.   
Trust, defined by Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla (1998) as a belief of 
positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can receive based on the expected action 
of another party in an interaction characterized by uncertainty, and defined by 
Lewicki and Bunker (1995) as a state involving confident positive expectations about 
another's motives regarding oneself in situations of risk, thus seems to be essentially 
important in studies with respect to the social exchange process where the risk and 
uncertainty from unspecified exchange contract and self-interested exchange partners 
may make the direct exchange difficult.     
 Couch, Adams, and Jones (1996) pointed out that two divergent forms of trust, 
dispositional trust and relational trust, are essential features of effective interpersonal 
functioning.  In this thesis, both dispositional trust (expectations toward people in 
general, generalized trust in this thesis) and relational trust (relationships with specific 
partners, trust in supervisor in this thesis) will be studied in their specific roles in the 
employer inducement – employee contribution process. 
In accordance with the above definitions of trust, trust in supervisor refers to 




fairness, honesty, and positive feelings (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985) in an 
environment with uncertainty and risk.   
Generalized trust, as defined by Rotter (1980), refers to a generalized 
expectancy held by an individual that the word, promise, oral or written statement of 
another individual or group can be relied on.   
Study 2 focuses on the employer inducement – employee contribution process, 
and evaluates the role of individual employee’s trust in supervisor in the inducement 
– contribution process.  Individual employee’s innate generalized trust, is argued in 
this study to be the individual trait which is likely to have a significant impact on the 
inducement – contribution process.  It is expected that trusting employees tend to 
interpret the reciprocity behavior of employers in a more favorable manner even 
though the reciprocated benefits may be of diverse form.  It is also expected that 
trusting individuals tend to believe in the reciprocation obligation of others and fulfill 
their own norm of reciprocity, even though they are not guaranteed in the exchange 
process.   
 
 What is more, in Study 2, the concept of employee performance obligation will 
be extended to contribution obligation.  Besides task performance obligation and 
contextual performance obligation which were examined in the exchange model 
(Figure 1), Study 2 also includes employee intent to leave as a reverse factor in 
employee contribution obligation.  These three categories of employee behavior 
obligation were selected as focal dependent variables for several reasons.  First, they 
are all essential to organizational effectiveness: individuals must first be induced to 
enter and remain with an organization (opposite to intent to leave); as employees, 




involvement in innovative and spontaneous activity beyond role requirements 
(contextual performance) (Katz and Kahn, 1978: 403).  Second, these variables have 
been shown to be salient with respect to a variety of exchange relationships (Graen, 
Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982; Wayne & Ferris, 1990; Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; 
Moorman, 1991; Organ & Konovsky, 1989; Shore & Wayne, 1993; Wayne & Green, 
1993) 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Study One:  
In the reciprocal social exchange relationship between employers and employees 
these parties, research questions regarding the bilateral exchange relationship between 
employers and employees will be examined: 
1. Is one party’s perception of the opposite party’s inducement/contribution 
associated with this party’s contribution/inducement obligation? 
 
2. Is one party’s expectation associated with this party’s inducement/ 
contribution obligation? 
 
3. Is one party’s inducement/contribution obligation associated with the 
opposite party’s perception of this party’s inducement/contribution? 
 
4. Is one party’s perception of the opposite party’s inducement/contribution 




In the employer inducement – employee contribution process, the role of dyadic trust 
will be examined: 
1. Is employee trust in supervisor associated with employee contribution 
obligation? 
 






3. Is employee generalized trust associated with employee perception of 
employer inducement, employee expectation, employee trust in supervisor, 
and employee contribution obligation? 
 
1.4 OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The thesis consists of five chapters.  Chapter 1 begins by briefly reviewing 
social exchange theory and the norm of reciprocity, the exchange model constructed 
by Barnard’s (2001) study.  Based on Barnard’s (2001) study, a replication study 
(Study 1) and an extension study (Study 2) are introduced.  In Chapter 2, hypotheses 
regarding the exchange relationships and the role of trust are proposed.  A modified 
exchange model and an alternative trust model are developed respectively for Study 1 
and Study 2.   In Chapter 3, the measurement and survey instruments are elaborated.   
The results of hypothesis testing are presented and explained in Chapter 4.  Finally, 
the thesis is concluded with a discussion of implications and avenues for future 











LITERATURE REVIEW & HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this chapter, two models based on the original exchange model are developed.  
The first model in Study 1, the Modified Exchange Model, is a replication and 
modification of Barnard’s (2001) study on employer – employee reciprocal social 
exchange process.  A second model, the Alternative Trust Model in Study 2, is an 
extension to the reciprocal social exchange study.  Hypotheses regarding employer – 
employee reciprocal social exchange as well as the role of trust in the exchange 
process are also proposed.   
Before delving into hypotheses development, it should be noted that although 
the term employee performance/turnover are frequently mentioned in my literature 
review, in the current research, perceived inducement, generalized trust, trust in 
supervisor, expectation these predictive variables are all studied on their influence on 
employees’ intention to perform the behaviors (performance obligation and intent to 
leave) following Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) statement that a person’s intention to 
perform the behavior is the best and immediate antecedents of his/her corresponding 
overt behaviors (p.381).  
 
2.1 MODEL OF STUDY 1: MODIFIED EXCHANGE MODELS 
Barnard’s (2001) study has tested the following three pairs of reciprocal social 
exchange relationships between employers and employees.  
The first pair is the relationship between the level of one party’s perception of 
the inducement/contribution by the opposite party and the level of 




norm of reciprocity emphasizing “people should help those who have helped them”. 
Specifically in the employment relationship, employees’ perception of the 
inducements they perceive from their employers will induce employees to behave in a 
way that is beneficial to the employers; and the organizational authorities’ 
perceptions of employees’ contribution will trigger employers to provide further 
inducements to their employees.  Both employers and employees recognize that they 
should return the benefit from the opposite party.  It is proposed:  
Hypothesis 1a: The level of employer inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with the level of contribution obligations recognized by 
employees.   
 
Hypothesis 1b: The level of employee contribution perceived by employers will be 
positively associated with the level of inducement obligations recognized by 
employers. 
 
The second pair of relationships involves the relationships between one party’s 
expectation regarding the opposite party’s contribution and this party’s own 
contribution obligation.  This is based on social exchange principle that individuals 
are be motivated to contribute to others by the returns they expect to receive from the 
others.  In the employer – employee relationship, employees’ obligation is aroused by 
what they expect to get from their employers, and employers’ obligation is also 
influenced by what they expect to get from their employees.   
It is proposed: 
Hypothesis 2a: The level of inducements that employees expect the employers to 
provide will be positively associated with the level of contribution obligations 
recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: The level of contributions that employers expect the employees to 
provide will be positively associated with the level of inducement obligations 
recognized by employers. 
 
The third is about the relationships between one party’s contribution obligation 




expected relationship is implied in both the norm of reciprocity and social exchange 
theory, since this is the recognition/perceiving process prerequisite for each party’s 
contribution to be effective in triggering the next step in the reciprocity/social 
exchange process (i.e. expectation from the opposite party, or obligation of the 
opposite party).  In the present replication study, it is assumed that the level of 
contribution obligations recognized by employees will affect the level of employers’ 
perception of employee performance, and the level of inducement obligations 
recognized by employees will affect the level of employee perception of employer 
inducement.  It is proposed: 
Hypothesis 3a: The level of contribution obligations recognized by employees will 
be positively associated with the level of employee contributions perceived by 
the employers.  
 
Hypothesis 3b: The level of inducement obligations recognized by employers will 
be positively associated with the level of employer inducements perceived by 
the employees. 
 
These three sets of hypotheses have been examined in the exchange model in 
Barnard’s (2001) study.  In this study, one more sets of relationships are integrated 
into the exchange models.   
In the original exchange model, employer expectation and employee 
expectation were regarded as exogenous variables, whereas in the current research, 
each party’s expectation of future contribution from the opposite party are argued to 
be influenced by this party’s perception of the opposite party’s contribution.  This 
argument is implied in social exchange theory: “If both individuals value what they 
receive from the other, both are prone to supply more of their own services to provide 
incentives for the other to increase his supply” (Blau, 1960: 89).  Only when one 
values or perceives the favors from the other, rather than overlooking that favor, will 




he/she helps out, and consequently will he/she supply more service as effective 
incentive. This point has been explicitly expressed by Rousseau (1995) who argued 
that employer practices including performance reviews, compensation practices, and 
training programs can shape the expectations that the employee has for the reciprocal 
exchanges, specifying employee obligations.   Empirical findings have also found that 
that individual expectation regarding future promotion opportunity is linked to their 
past promotion success (Souza, 2002), and that the past performance of the 
employees should influence the services that the supervisors expect the employees to 
perform in the future (Robinson & Rousseau, 1994; Rousseau, 1990; Schein, 1978). 
All the above theoretical and empirical supporting points are from employee 
perspective; one argument from employer perspective is from Eden (1990: 106): 
employer expectation regarding subordinate performance originates from various 
sources, one of which is employer knowledge of previous subordinate performance.  
Knowing previous contribution increases employer expectation for that employee’s 
contribution in the future, whereas evaluating poor previous contribution lowers 
employer expectation.   
Therefore, it is proposed here: 
Hypothesis 4a: The level of employer inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with the level of inducements that employees expect the 
employers to provide. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: The level of employee contributions perceived by employers will 
be positively associated with the level of contributions that employers expect 
the employees to provide. 
 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the modified exchange model which includes the newly 
hypothesized relationship between one party’s perception of the other party’s 
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employees.  Rather, whether those hypothesized relationships are supported or not is 
the key to answer the research questions.  
Specifically, Figure 4.1 represents employers’ influence on employees 
(relationship 1a, 2a, and 3a are based on the original model, relationship 4a is an 
extension).Figure 4.2 represents employees’ influence on employers (relationship 1b, 
2b, and 3b are based on the original model; relationship 4b is an extension). 
Figure 4.1: Modified Exchange Model  



























Figure 4.2: Modified Exch



















































2.2 MODEL OF STUDY 2—ALTERNATIVE TRUST MODEL 
 
As introduced in Chapter 1, the alternative trust model in the new study will 
take the modified exchange model as its starting point, but it will focus only on 
employer influence on employees, it will examine the role of trust in the reciprocal 
exchange process in particular, and it will test how trust in supervisor and generalized 
trust may affect desirable employee contribution obligation directly or indirectly. 
Before looking at the role of trust, two sets of hypotheses regarding employee 
contribution obligations need to be extended and restated because employee 
contribution obligations are the focal variables in Study 2.  
 
2.2.1 Social Exchange and Reciprocity 
A central theorem of organizational support theory, and related streams of 
research that also draw on the principles of social exchange and reciprocity, is that 
employees should reciprocate for the perceived benefits they receive from their 
employers or supervisors by offering higher levels of performance both on 
conventional job responsibilities and citizenship behaviors (Eisenberger, Huntington, 
Hutchison, Sowa, 1986; Eisenberger, Fasolo, & Davis-LaMastro, 1990; Rhoades & 
Eisenberger, 2002; Settoon, Bennett, & Liden, 1996), and higher desire to remain 
(Nye & Witt, 1993; Witt, 1991; Witt & Nye, 1992), lower intention to leave (Allen, 
Shore, & Griffeth, 1999; Aquino & Griffeth, 1999; Guzzo, Noonan, & Elron, 1994; 
Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997).  The obligation to perform organizationally preferred 
behaviors reflects employees’ urges to repay the perceived employer support.   
This relationship has been proposed in Hypothesis 1a.  It was extended to 
separately evaluate each of the three categories of employee obligation in the 




Hypothesis 1a-1: The level of inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with the level of task performance obligations recognized 
by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 1a-2: The level of inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with the level of contextual performance obligations 
recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 1a-3: The level of inducements perceived by employees will be 
negatively associated with their intent to leave. 
 
 
Employee expectations are employee beliefs regarding rewards from employers 
(Rousseau, 1990).  A basic principle of social exchange theory is that people are 
motivated to engage in beneficial behavior by their expectation of return benefits 
from their exchange partners.  Based on that principle, Coyle-Shapiro (2002) argued 
that employees’ expectations/beliefs regarding the inducements that the organization 
is obligated to provide will have a positive impact on their performance.  Other 
psychological contracts scholars have also suggested that employees’ perceptions of 
their own obligations toward the organization are linked to their beliefs of the 
organizations’ obligations toward themselves (Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau and 
McLean Parks, 1993; Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998).  Specifically, Johnson and 
O’Leary-Kelly (2003) confirmed that employees’ in-role work performance and 
organizational citizenship behavior are negatively related to their beliefs that their 
employers have failed to meet their obligations; Robinson and Rousseau (1994) found 
that employees’ intentions to remain (an inverse of intent to leave) with their 
employer are negatively related to their beliefs that their employees have broken their 
promises.  Based on this line of reasoning, it is predicted that employees’ expectation 
regarding the inducements that the organization is obligated to provide will have a 
positive impact on employees’ level of recognized task and contextual performance 




This relationship has been proposed in Hypothesis 2a.  It was extended to 
separately evaluate each of the three categories of employee obligation in the 
alternative model: 
Hypothesis 2a-1: The level of inducements that employees believe the 
organization is obligated to provide will be positively associated with the level 
of task performance obligations recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 2a-2: The level of inducements that employees believe the 
organization is obligated to provide will have a positive impact on the level of 
contextual performance obligations recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 2a-3: The level of inducements that employees believe the 
organization is obligated to provide will have a negative impact on employees’ 
intent to leave.  
 
 
Hypothesis 3a (the positive relationship between employee performance 
obligation and employer perception of employee performance) will also be examined 
in the alternative model.  However, in this thesis, it will only be extended to separate 
evaluation of employee task and contextual performance obligations. The relationship 
between employee intent to leave and employer perception of employee turnover is 
not studied: 
Hypothesis 3a-1: The level of task performance obligations recognized by 
employees will be positively associated with the level of employee task 
performance perceived by the employers.  
 
Hypothesis 3a-2: The level of contextual performance obligations recognized by 
employees will be positively associated with the level of employee contextual 
performance perceived by the employers.  
 
 
Hypothesis 4a proposed the positive association between employee perception 
of employer inducement and employee expectation regarding employer inducement.  
This relationship is also included in the alternative model and is restated here as: 
Hypothesis 4a: The level of employer inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with the level of inducements that employees expect the 





2.2.2 Relational Trust: Trust in Supervisor  
It has long been suggested that trust is central to any cooperative relationship, 
influencing each party’s behavior toward the other (Deutsch, 1958; Blau, 1964; Zand, 
1972).  In the employment relationship, many authors have noted the desirability of 
organizations or supervisors cultivating a trust-based social exchange relationship 
between themselves and their employees or subordinates (Fox, 1974; Mahoney & 
Watson, 1993; Walton, 1985).  Following Bhattacharya, Devinney & Pillutla’s (1998) 
definition of trust as a belief of positive (or nonnegative) outcomes that one can 
receive based on the expected action of another party in an interaction characterized 
by uncertainty, trust in supervisor is defined here as an employee’s belief of the 
inducement he/she can receive based on the expected action of his/her employer in 
the social exchange processes arising out of the employment relationship.  In the 
context of social exchange, there is unspecified obligation and there is uncertainty to 
assure an appropriate return in the interaction between employers and employees.   
Trust results in higher levels of cooperation, and superior levels of performance 
(Dirks & Ferrin, 2001).  The degree of trust an individual has in a work partner has 
been shown to positively affect desirable work outcomes such as individuals’ job/task 
performance (Earley, 1986; Oldham, 1975; Rich, 1997; Robinson, 1996) and 
organizational citizenship behaviors (Konovsky & Pugh, 1994; McAllister, 1995; 
Pillai, Schriesheim, & Williams, 1999; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Moorman, & Fetter, 
1990; Robinson, 1996), and to negatively affect undesirable work outcomes like 
turnover intentions (Robinson, 1996; Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; Kramer, 1999). In the 
employment relationship, it has been found that employee trust in supervisor 
determines their performance obligation and turnover intention (Davis, Schoorman, 




likely to believe that their contributions to the organization will be reciprocated in 
some way.  They will be more willing to invest further in the relationship by 
performing better on both task and contextual behaviors and thinking less of leaving. 
On the contrary, if an employer is not trusted, employees have less confidence that 
their contributions will be rewarded.  Their motivation to contribute to the 
organization will decline. 
Based on the above argument regarding the relationship between employees’ 
trust in supervisor and employees’ task/contextual performance obligation as well as 
intention to leave, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5-1: Trust in supervisor will be positively associated with the level 
of task performance obligations recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 5-2: Trust in supervisor will be positively associated with the level 
of contextual performance obligations recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 5-3: Trust in supervisor will be negatively associated with intention 
to leave. 
 
In a conceptual article, Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard and Werner (1998) argued 
that employee perceptions of the way they are treated by organizational authorities 
are likely to influence their level of trust in their supervisors.  On this basis, they 
suggested that supervisors need to cultivate their subordinates’ trust by showing 
consideration for employees’ concerns.  Employers who exhibit these caring 
behaviors will increase the likelihood that employees will reciprocate with trust. In 
support of that proposition, Korsgaard, Schweiger and Sapienza (1995) found that 
followers who had been treated with consideration had more trust in their leaders than 
those who had not been treated with consideration.  In a quasi-experimental study, 
Mayer and Davis (1999) found that the introduction of a performance appraisal 




higher trust in managers.  Similarly, Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, and Tan (2000) found 
that employees’ perceptions of their managers’ benevolence was associated with their 
trust in the managers.  The psychological contract literature has also suggested that 
where one party perceives the other to have failed to fulfill its obligations, this could 
elicit feelings of anger and betrayal as erosion of trust (Robinson and Rousseau, 
1994). 
Based on above argument, it is proposed: 
Hypothesis 6: The level of inducements perceived by employees will be 
positively associated with trust in supervisor.  
 
 
If this hypothesis and the preceding set of hypotheses are both confirmed, the 
results will indicate that perceived inducements could have an indirect impact on 
recognized performance obligations and intent to leave by way of trust in supervisor.  
 
2.2.3 Dispositional Trust: Generalized Trust 
The preceding hypotheses all deal with employees’ perceptions of the 
interaction between themselves and their employer or supervisor, but many scholars 
have suggested that individual differences should also be taken into account. Organ 
and Ryan (1995), and Borman, Penner, Allen, and Motowidlo (2001) documented 
that individual differences in personality traits and affect account for significant 
amounts of variance in citizenship behavior.  Jenkins (1993) found the impact of 
individual differences in personality on intention to leave the organization. 
Insofar as trust is recognized as a key element in the social exchange processes 
that occur in the context of the employment relationship, it is believed that 
generalized trust is likely to be a particularly salient individual trait.  Researchers 




involving high uncertainty (Rotter, 1980).  It is believed that generalized trust is 
relevant to the social exchange process in the employment relationship, because the 
behavior of both parties in the exchange process is ambiguous and unpredictable.  
The general argument is that people who tend to trust others under conditions of 
uncertainty assume that their contributions will eventually be reciprocated, so they 
consider it worthwhile to become actively involved.  
In order to test the general proposition that generalized trust plays a significant 
role in the social exchange process, it is necessary to state specifically how it is pre-
dicted to influence the other variables. In this regard, the first relationship that should 
be considered is the direct relationship between generalized trust and the level of 
obligations recognized by employees.  A positive relationship between these variables 
is predicted on the basis of research showing that people who have high generalized 
trust tend to be helpful and altruistic, and to act in a trustworthy manner (Couch, 
Adams, & Jones, 1996; Deutsch, 1958; Rotter, 1980).  Based on this line of reasoning, 
it is believed that employees high in generalized trust will recognize a higher level of 
task and contextual performance obligations and will have less intention of leaving 
the organization.  
Based on the above argument about generalized trust, I propose these 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 7-1: Generalized trust will be positively associated with the level of 
task performance obligations recognized by employees. 
 
Hypothesis 7-2: Generalized trust will be positively associated with the level of 
contextual performance obligations recognized by employees.  
 






The notion that a person’s generalized trust is positively associated with the 
person’s trust in specific exchange partners is supported by a great deal of conceptual 
and empirical literature.  Couch, Adams, and Jones (1996) found that generalized 
trust is highly correlated with both “network trust” and “partner trust.” Similarly, 
Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone (1998) found generalized trust to be a personality trait 
that is associated with employees’ trust toward specific individuals and toward the 
organization.  In accordance with this literature, it can be predicted that generalized 
trust will be positively associated with trust in supervisor.  
Hypothesis 8: Generalized trust will be positively associated with trust in 
supervisor. 
 
Employee generalized trust should also be positively related to employee 
expectation according to Farris, Senner, and Butterfield’s (1973: 145) argument that 
generalized trust lead to generalized expectation about the trustworthy behaviors of 
others – in this study, employees with high generalized trust can be predicted to hold 
higher level of expectation about the promised return from their employers.   
Generalized trust is associated not only with trust in a specific person (e.g., trust 
in supervisor); it is also associated with high expectations regarding the behavior of 
others.  For example, Farris, Senner and Butterfield (1973: 145) suggested that 
generalized trust gives rise to a general expectation that others will behave in a 
trustworthy manner.  Much of the early literature on trust focused on an individual’s 
general orientation toward human nature and the extent to which people assume that 
the others with whom they came in contact will respond sensitively and reliably to 
their personal needs (Erikson, 1964).  As this relates to the employment relationship, 




employers or supervisors will fulfill their obligations to reciprocate and/ or to meet 
the employees’ personal needs.   
There is a similar argument but from opposite perspective – employer 
perspective.  Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, and Werner (1998) discussed that the 
employers’ generalized trust may influence their beliefs and expectations regarding 
the reciprocation from employee and hence, could be a factor influencing employers’ 
tendency to engage in trustworthy behavior to enroll in social exchange process.  
Although it is from employer perspective, it can be applied on employee side as well: 
Employees’ generalized trust may influence their expectation of employer 
reciprocation and hence, their contribution obligation. Of course, the relationship 
between employee expectation and employee obligation has been proposed in earlier 
hypotheses, only the relationship between generalized trust and employee expectation 
will be posited here: 
Hypothesis 9: Generalized trust will be positively associated with the level of 
inducements that employees believe the organization is obligated to provide.   
 
There is one more way in which variation in a person’s generalized trust could 
affect his/her experience in an exchange relationship.  Several authors have suggested 
that generalized trust should be considered a dispositional characteristic that reflects 
the extent to which people perceive and interpret their experiences in a positive way 
(Couch, Adams, & Jones, 1996: 319).  As will be explained below, this 
conceptualization is consistent with the specific items that were included in the 
International Personality Item Pool (2001) scale that we used to measure generalized 
trust.  Insofar as this measure of generalized trust reflects a generally positive outlook 




perceive the inducements they receive from their employer more positively than those 
who have low generalized trust. 
It is therefore proposed:  
Hypothesis 10: Generalized trust will be positively associated with the level of 
inducements perceived by employees.     
 
Hypotheses 8, 9, and 10 all predict that generalized trust will be positively 
associated with variables that were predicted (in earlier hypotheses) to be associated 
directly and/or indirectly with the level of obligations recognized by employees or 
employees’ intent to leave.  If these hypotheses are confirmed, the results will 
indicate that total impact of generalized trust on the outcome variables consists of 
both the direct relationships (as predicted by Hypotheses 7-1, 7-2 and 7-3) and also 
indirect relationships by way of trust in supervisor, employee expectations regarding 
organizational inducements, and employee perceptions of organizational inducements.   
Figure 5 shows the framework of the Alternative Trust Model.  Hypothesized 















































Table 2: Summary of Proposed Hypotheses for Testing the Alternative Model 
 
H1a Ee perception of Er inducement Æ Ee obligation 
H1a-1    Ee perception of Er inducement Æ Ee task obligation 
H1a-2    Ee perception of Er inducement Æ Ee contextual obligation 
H1a-3    Ee perception of Er inducement Æ Ee intent to leave (–) 
H2a Ee expectation Æ Ee obligation 
H2a-1    Ee expectation Æ Ee task obligation 
H2a-2    Ee expectation Æ Ee contextual obligation  
H2a-3    Ee expectation Æ Ee intention to leave (–) 
H3a Ee obligation Æ Er perception of employee contribution 
H4a Ee perception of Er inducement Æ Ee expectation  
H5 Trust in supervisor Æ Ee obligation 
H5-1    Trust in supervisor Æ Ee task obligation 
H5-2    Trust in supervisor ÆEe contextual obligation 
H5-3    Trust in supervisor Æ Ee intent to leave (–) 
H6 Employee perception of employer inducement ÆTrust in supervisor 
H7 Generalized trust Æ Ee obligation 
H7-1    Generalized trust Æ Employee task obligation 
H7-2    Generalized trust Æ Employee contextual obligation 
H7-3    Generalized trust Æ Employee intent to leave (–) 
H8 Generalized trust Æ Trust in supervisor  
H9 Generalized trust Æ Ee expectation  
H10 Generalized trust Æ Ee perception of Er inducement  








This chapter describes the measures used for the variables in both the modified 
exchange model and the alternative model.  The procedures of pilot study and the 
item selection based on pilot data are detailed.  The instrument for the formal survey 
is also introduced. 
 
3.1 MEASURES  
3.1.1 Measures for Study 1 
Two scales were developed for the six variables in the modified exchange 
model: employer inducement and employee performance.   
Employer Inducement.  This scale was newly developed to measure employer 
obligation to provide inducement, employee expectation regarding employer 
inducement, and employee perception of employer inducement.  Measures for 
employer obligation began with “Supervisors or company representatives in our 
company generally feel an obligation to…” on the questionnaire designed for 
employer.  Measures for Employee expectation began with “I believe my company 
(supervisor) has the responsibility to….” On the questionnaire designed for employee.  
Employee perception of employer inducement was measured directly by employee. 
The new measures do not differentiate various types (e.g., pay, promotion, 







Table 3: Measures for Employee Inducement 
 
 1. Reward employees on the basis of specific performance criteria. 
2. Give higher pay to employees who put in extra effort. 
3. Ensure that good performance is appreciated and rewarded. 





Employee Performance.  This scale was newly developed for measuring 
employee performance obligation, employer expectation regarding employee 
performance, and employer perception of employee performance.  Measures for 
employee obligation appeared on the questionnaire designed for employees, with the 
sentence “As part of my job, I have an obligation to…” at the beginning of the section.  
Measures for employer expectation appeared on the questionnaire designed for 
employers, beginning with the sentence “I expect the employees in my unit to…”  
Employer perception of employee performance was measured through employer 
evaluation of employee performance.   
Employee performance in the exchange model is composed with two 
dimensions: task performance and contextual performance (Table 4).  
Task performance refers to items relating to the performance standards that 
employees are expected to meet when performing their normally assigned tasks and 
duties.  Seven items were used to measure task performance.  Five items (item 1-5) 
were adapted from Williams and Anderson’s (1991) measures of in-role performance.  
Two items (item 6-7) were from Tsui, Pearce, Porter, and Tripoli (1997). 
Contextual performance refers to items relating to employee behaviors that are 
beneficial to coworkers or company by contributing to a good working environment 
or improving work processes.  Four items (item 1-4) were taken from Van Scotter and 




(item 5-7) were taken from Tsui, Pearce, Porter, and Tripoli (1997) organization 
directed citizenship behavior scale. 
These two scales were each regarded as reflective measures as they were 
normally treated in previous studies.  However, the construct employee performance, 
which is a combination of these two scales, is a formative measure (Fornell & 
Bookstein, 1982) with two factors (Figure 6).  As the result, variables including 
employer expectation, employer perception of employee performance and employee 
performance obligation, were measured by the reflective first-order, formative 
second-order measure (Jarvis, Mackenzie, & Podsakoff, 2003) Employee 
Performance (Figure 6); while the variables employee task performance obligation 
and employee contextual performance obligation were respectively studied when they 
were dependent variables – were measured by the two reflective measures (task 






























1. Carry out the responsibilities specifically listed in my (his/her) 
employment handbook. 
2. Complete the tasks that are assigned to me (him/her) within the allotted 
time. 
3. Use my time efficiently in carrying out the responsibilities for which I  
(he/she) will be evaluated in my (his/her) performance appraisals. 
4. Not neglect any aspect of my (his/her) own routine duties. 
5. Always complete all aspects of my (his/her) own basic duties. 
6. Insist on high quality standards in the way I (he/she) perform(s) the tasks 
that come within the scope of my (his/her) responsibility. 




1. Praise co-workers when they are successful. 
2. Offer support and/or encouragement to co-workers with personal 
difficulties. 
3. Discuss matters with my (his/her) co-workers before taking any action 
that might affect them. 
4. Try to find something to say that inspire my co-workers and boost the 
morale of our unit. 
5. Make suggestions to improve my (his/her) unit. 
6. Express my views boldly if there are any policies or procedures that 
interfere with goal achievement in my (his/her) unit. easures for Study 2 
Employee Task Obligation and Employee Contextual Obligation.  Same as the 
res used in exchange model. 
Intent to Leave.  Employee intent to leave was the third category of employee 
bution obligation, beyond task performance obligation and contextual 
mance obligation.  It was measured by items from Robinson’s (1996, borrowed 
Chatman, 1991) intentions to remain scale, Chatman’s (1991) intent to leave 
and Granrose and Portwood’s (1987) search for external alternatives scale.  




Francesco’s (2000) suggestion that when employees begin to think about leaving their 
jobs, they are also likely to consider other opportunities and search more actively for 
them. 
After deleting redundant items in the three scales, the measure of intent to leave 
comes out with six items (Table 5).   






















1. I would prefer a job other than the one that I have now. 
2. Since I began working in my present company, I have often considered 
finding a job in a different company. 
3. I think I will still be working for my current company three years from 
now (R). 
4. I am, or very soon will be, looking for a job in another company. 
5. If I were offered a job in a different company, I would accept it. 
6. There are other companies for which I would rather work. 
 
neralized Trust.  This scale used the measurement from the International 
ity Item Pool’s (2001) trust scale.  Measures start with the sentence “I am the 
erson who generally tends to…”.   The 10-item measure includes items like 
hers”, “Believe that others have good intentions”, “Trust what people say”, 
 that people are basically moral”, “Believe in human goodness”, “Think that 
e well”, “Distrust people”, “Suspect hidden motives in others”, “Be wary of 
nd “Believe that people are essentially evil”. 
st in Supervisor.  Employees’ trust in their supervisor was measured using 
 from Robinson’s (1996) study which included seven items reflecting the 
f trust identified by Gabarro and Athos (1976).  Sample items include “I 
y supervisor has high integrity”, “I can trust my supervisor to treat me in a 




Scale anchors, for all these scales, ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 
(strongly agree). 
 
Control Variables.  Several additional variables were controlled for in the 
analyses.  Tenure with the organization was controlled because it might influence 
employees’ attachment to the organization and the rewards received by employees.  
Education was controlled for its possible impact on employee expectation.  Salary 
was controlled because it might affect employee contribution obligation.  Also, 
because there were demographic differences across samples, gender, age and marital 
status were also controlled for.   
 
3.2 SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
Three sets of survey instruments were used: an employee survey, a supervisor 
survey, and a performance evaluation survey which was completed by supervisors for 
each subordinate.   
 
3.2.1 Employee survey 
The employee survey includes questions regarding employee expectation of 
employee inducement, employee perception of employer inducement, employee 
obligation to make contribution, employee generalized trust, and employee trust in 
supervisor.  At the end of the survey, employees were asked to indicate their gender, 
marriage status, age, tenure, department, job title, education level, and numbers of 






3.2.2 Supervisor Survey 
Employees’ direct supervisors represent employers in this study. The supervisor 
survey includes questions regarding employer expectation of employee contribution 
and employer obligation to make inducement.  At the end of the survey, supervisors 
were asked to indicate the length of time they had worked in their current unit, the 
length of time they had been in their current position, and the number of employees 
under their direct supervision.  
 
3.2.3 Performance Survey 
Performance survey was only used for the modified exchange model.  It 
measures employer perception of employee contribution (task and contextual 
performance only in modified exchange model).  Supervisors were asked to complete 
the performance survey for each of their subordinate who has finished the employee 
survey.  At the end of the performance evaluation form, supervisor is required to 
indicate the length of time the subordinate has worked under his/her supervision. 
 
All the three sets of survey instruments were designed in English, translated 
from English into Chinese by myself and modified by several bilingual (English and 
Chinese) students.  Then the Chinese version was translated back into English in a 
professional translation company.  Discrepancies were compared as the basis for 
further improvement on the Chinese version of the questionnaire, which was 
administered in the later pilot study among Chinese in Singapore and in the final 
survey in China. 





3.3 PILOT STUDY 
3.3.1 Respondents 
Only the employee survey was administered in the pilot study. 
100 working adults were invited to the pilot mail survey from the beginning of 
March, 2002.  Because future formal study was planed to be conducted in China, 
Chinese employees including Chinese from PRC and Singaporean Chinese were the 
pilot survey subjects. 
A total of 69 questionnaires were returned.  Approximately 52.2% of the 
respondents were 21-30 years old, 34.8% were between 30 and 40, and 13% were 
above 40.  About 40.6% of the respondents were male and 50.7% were married.  
31.9% of the subjects have a master degree or above, 40.6% have a bachelor degree, 
1.4% from technical school, 17.4% graduated from senior middle school and 7.2% 
from junior middle school or below.  
As to nationality, among the 69 respondents, 37.7 % were Singaporean, 55.1% 
were Chinese, and the rest made no answer. 
 
3.3.2 Procedures 
Before the pilot survey, the questionnaire was pre-tested with six postgraduate 
students.  The objective was to determine the time it will take to answer all the 
questions and to confirm that the wording were understandable and unambiguous.  It 
was found that it would take around 15-20 minutes to complete the employee 
questionnaire.  Minor changes in the wording were made according to the suggestions 
from participants.  
The pilot survey was administered by mail.  Each participant received a packet 




confidentiality.  Each respondent was instructed in the cover letter to seal the 
completed questionnaire into the envelope and mail it directly to me.  
 
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
One of the returned questionnaires has missing data over one page.  It was 
removed from analysis.  There are 68 valid responses left.  
To verify that all the items were measuring the appropriate scale, inter-item 
correlation and Cronbach’s alpha were examined for the items in each reflective 
variable.  Inter-item correlation analysis requires that items that correlated at less 
than .40 with all the other items in the scale should be eliminated (Hinkin, 1998; 
Kumar & Beyerlein, 1991).  As the result, one item in employee contextual 
performance and one item in intent to leave were eliminated.  
Finally, Cronbach’s alpha score was calculated for each scale, as shown in 
Table 6.  Although the Cronbach alpha score was a little bit too low for felt 
responsibility (.67), I took this less strict approach based on my expectation that there 





Table 6: Cronbach’s Alpha Scores for Pilot Study Data 
 
Scale  # of Items Cronbach’s Alpha 
 EE expectation 4 .80 
 EE Task Performance 7 .82 
 EE Contextual Performance 6 .80 
 Intent to Leave 5 .82 
 Perceived employer inducement 4 .80 
 Generalized Trust 10 .88 







3.4 SURVEY ADMINISTRATION 
The main survey was conducted in Ningbo, China during May and June, 2002, 
with questionnaires distributed and collected directly in the participating ten 
companies.  517 employees and 53 direct supervisors from 53 working groups were 
targeted for the survey.  All the employee and supervisor respondents received a big 
envelop to enclose their completed questionnaires.  To assure that it would be 
possible to correctly match questionnaires from employees and the supervisor 
working in the same group, employees were asked to write their names on the 
Employee Questionnaire, and supervisors were required to write their subordinates’ 
names on the corresponding Employee Performance Evaluation Questionnaire as well 
as seal into one envelop their own Supervisor Questionnaire and the evaluation 
questionnaires for all his/her subordinates.   






Chapter  4 
 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
4.1 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSES  
For the returned questionnaires, they were eliminated from further analysis if 
there were missing data over a section or over a page, or the matching supervisor or 
performance questionnaires could not be found.  It was detected that some of the 
employees copied their colleague’s answer.  In this case, both questionnaires were 
removed.  In one of the ten companies, all the questionnaires were totally eliminated 
because after removing unqualified respondents, the left number of employees for 
each supervisor was not enough for further analysis.  This procedure left valid sets of 
questionnaires from 394 employees, along with corresponding supervisor and 
performance questionnaires from 46 supervisors. 
 
4.1.1 Demographics of the Sample  
The average tenure of supervisors was 12.89 years and the average number of 
years they had been in their current positions was 5.08 years.  For employees, their 
average tenure was 12.11 years. 24.6% of employees were aged 25 or below and 
13.2% were above 50 years old.  Most of the employees were male (73.9%) and more 
than half were married (66.2%).  As to education level, 25.9% have a bachelor degree 
and 54.8% graduate from high schools and technical schools.   
 
4.1.2 Intraclass Correlations Analysis  
Because the data were collected from working groups, interaction within group 
is a concern in this study.  Interaction in a group makes the scores of persons within 
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the same group more similar to each other than scores of individuals from different 
groups.  If individual scores are analyzed, greater within-group similarity than 
between-group similarity violates independence, the basic statistical assumption for 
correlation analysis, factor analysis, reliability analysis and regression analysis.  I 
must first examine whether the data are independent.  Nonindependence in the 
multilevel design can be measured through the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 






WB ,    ……………………………………………….. (a) 
where MSB and MSW are the mean square between and within groups, respectively, 
and n is the number of persons in each group, which is assumed to be the same for all 
groups. 
MSB and MSW can be calculated through ANOVA.  However, the number of 
persons in each group (see Appendix A) is not the same for all the groups in my 
sample data.  The number of persons in each group for unequal group size, n’, is 






















In my sample data, N = 394, k = 46.  nj for each group can be found in 




Then through equation (a), ICC for the endogenous constructs in the alternative 
model were calculated and summarized in Table 9. 
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Ee a expectation .480 .161 2.982 .000 .188 
Ee obligation .447 .155 2.878 .000 .181 
  Ee task obligation .593 .214 2.766 .000 .172 
  Ee contextual obligation .479 .189 2.535 .000 .152 
Intent to leave 1.468 .392 3.750 .000 .243 
Er perception of Ee performance .707 .145 4.863 .000 .312 
  Ee task performance .817 .168 4.857 .000 .311 
  Ee context. performance 1.007 .186 5.399 .000 .340 
Ee perception of Er inducement 1.533 .532 2.881 .000 .180 
Trust in supervisor 1.502 .497 3.023 .000 .191 
Note: Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Org = Organizational; MSB and MSW are the mean 
squares between and within groups, respectively.  
 
 
Table 7 shows that all the proposed endogenous variables in this study have 
systematic group-level variance, as indicated by the significant F statistics.  The 
proportion of group-level variance for these variables ranges from 15.2% to 34.0%. 
Given the classical ANOVA assumptions, if the intraclass correlations are not 
statistically significant, then the individual level of analysis would seem appropriate 
(Hays, 1973).  However the intraclass correlations are significant for all the proposed 
endogenous variables in this study. 
To eliminate the group level effect, group mean centered data were adjusted 
from the original data.  This includes two steps: 1) create a contextual variable that 
contains the group mean for the variable of interest; 2) compute the group mean 
centered variable by taking the original variable minus the group variable.  In this 




j is the mean of the group to 
which x belongs.  
After producing the adjusted data, analyses including exploratory factor 
analysis, regression analysis, and structural equation modeling can be conducted 
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without concern of nonindependence.  In the following text, these analyses will be 
performed to further examine the measures and to test the hypothesized relationships. 
However, for group level analysis, the results in Table 7 indicate within-group 
agreement and are reliable indicators of group level phenomenon. 
 
4.1.3 Exploratory Factor Analysis  
For all the nine variables in Study 2, generalized trust, employee perception of 
employer inducement, employee expectation, trust in supervisor, task performance 
obligation, contextual performance obligation, intent to leave, employer perception of 
employee task performance, and employer perception of employee contextual 
performance, exploratory factor analysis was performed to test their construct validity.  
Using principal component extraction method and Varimax rotation method, the 
items measuring the nine constructs were loaded on eight factors.  Except that the 
items of employer perception of employee task and contextual performance were 
loaded onto one single factor, all the other remaining items can load clearly on the 
rest seven constructs.  The total variance explained by the eight factors is 56.40%.  
Table 8 lists the results of the exploratory factor analysis and the Cronbach’s alpha 




 Table 8 
Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 
Factors Items 
1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cronbach’s  
α 
Employee Expectation          
1. Reward employees on the basis of specific performance criteria. .61        5 
3         
4         
4         
         
.6
2. Give higher pay to employees who put in extra effort. .7
3. Provide promotion opportunities more quickly to employees who perform particularly 
well. 
.6




1. Give higher pay to employees who put in extra effort.  76       6 
 72        
 77        
 82        
        
. .8
2. Reward employees on the basis of specific performance criteria. .
3. Provide promotion opportunities more quickly to employees who perform particularly 
well. 
.
4. Ensure that good performance is appreciated and rewarded. .
 Task Obligation 
1. Carry out the responsibilities specifically listed in my employment handbook.   5      7 
  5       
  2       
  4       
  1       
         
.6 .7
2. Use my time efficiently in carrying out the responsibilities for which I will be 
evaluated in my performance appraisals. 
.5
3. Always complete all aspects of my own basic duties. .7
4. Complete the tasks that are assigned to me within the allotted time. .7
5. Work strictly in accordance with the formal requirements of my job. .5
Contextual Obligation 
1. Discuss matters with my co-workers before taking any action that might affect them.    0     1 
   0      
   2      
   3      
   4      
.5 .7
2. Praise co-workers when they are successful. .4
3. Make suggestions to improve my unit. .6
4. Express my views boldly if there are any policies or procedures that interfere with goal 
achievement in my unit. 
.7






 Factors Items 
1       2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Cronbach’s  
α 
Intent to Leave          
1. I would prefer a job other than the one that I have now.     2    9 
    4     
    8     
    0     
    5     
         
.7 .7
2. Since I began working in my present company, I have often considered finding a job in 
a different company. 
.7
3. I am, or very soon will be, looking for a job in another company. .7
4. If I were offered a job in a different company, I would accept it. .7
5. There are other companies for which I would rather work. .6
Generalized Trust 
1. Trust others.      80   4 
     78    
     69    
        
. .7
2. Believe that others have good intentions. .
3. Trust what people say. .
 Trust in Supervisor 
1. I believe my supervisor has high integrity.       75  7 
      75   
      73   
      69   
       
. .8
2. I can trust my supervisor to treat me in a sincere attitude. .
3. In general, I believe my supervisor’s motives and intentions are good. .
4. My supervisor is very frank with me. .
 Employee Performance  
1. Uses time efficiently in carrying out the responsibilities for which he or she will be 
evaluated in his/her performance appraisal. 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
.65 .84
2. Completes the tasks that are assigned to him or her within the allotted time. .69
3. Always completes all aspects of his or her own routine duties. .72
4. Work strictly in accordance with the formal requirements of my job. .65
5. Carries out responsibilities as specifically listed in his or her employment handbook. .69
6. Try to find something to say that inspire co-workers and boost the morale of our unit. .56
7. Offers support and/or encouragement to co-workers with personal difficulties. .55
8. Express views boldly if there are any policies or procedures that interfere with goal 
achievement in the unit. 
.64
9. Makes suggestions to improve the unit. .62








The generally accepted lower limit of Cronbach Alpha is .70 (Hair, Anderson, 
Tatham, & Black, 1998: 118).  And a Cronbach Alpha beyond .90 may indicate 
redundant items and inefficiency in developing measurement scales (Van de Ven & 
Ferry, 1980: 80).  In this study, the Cronbach alpha for each scale is within the 
desirable range except for employee expectation (α = .65).   
 
4.1.4 Means, Standard Deviations and Correlations 
The means, standard deviations and correlations for the measured variables 
were also examined, based on both the original raw data and the group-mean-centered 
data.  Table 9 reports the results of these analyses on the raw data.  It was found that 
the control variables have little correlation with outcomes variable (i.e., employee 
task obligation, contextual obligation, and intent to leave) and they will no longer be 
included in later analyses. 
 
Table 10 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations calculated on 
the group-mean-centered data. The data from supervisor survey (employer 
expectation and employer obligation) were not included in the table, since their 






Means, Standard Deviations, and Unadjusted Correlations  
At Individual Level (N = 394 for employees and N=46 for Employers) 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 2a 2b 3 3a 3b 4 5 
1. Ee expectation 4.44 .44
2. Er expectation 4.44 .33 .13**
2a.Er task expectation 4.50 .40 .14** .92**
2b.Er context. expectation 4.37 .33 .09 .88** .63**
3. Ee obligation 4.20 .43 .47** .07 .10** .03 
3a.Ee task obligation 4.31 .49 .50** .12* .15** .06 .91**
3b.Ee context. obligation 4.09 .47 .35** .01 .03 -.01 .90** .63**
4. Intent to leave 2.72 .72 -.24** .07 -.01 .15** -.28** -.30** -.20**
5. Er obligation 4.50 .43 .07 .74** .65** .70** .03 .08 -.03 .09 
6. Ee performance 4.13 .46 .13** .04 .04 .02 .16** .18** .11* -.18** .13**
6a.Ee task performance 4.26 .49 .10** .09 .11* .05 .13** .17** .06 -.19** .13**
6b.Ee context. performance 4.00 .53 .13** -.02 -.03 -.01 .15** .15** .13** -.13** .10*
7. Er inducement 3.72 .80 .21** -.03 -.03 -.02 .39** .35** .35** -.25** -.10 
8. Generalized trust 3.79 .70 .25** .02 -.01 .04 .39** .37** .33** -.14** .01 
9. Trust in supervisor 3.69 .78 .24** -.08 -.07 -.07 .44** .38** .41** -.40** -.18**
10. Gender .30 .76 .06 .04 .02 .05 -.06 -.06 -.06 .05 -.02 
11. Marital status .82 1.13 -.03 -.03 -.02 -.03 -.07 -.07 -.05 .04 .03 
12. Age 3.50 2.21 .04 -.09 -.07 -.10* -.01 .00 -.01 -.18** .02 
13. Tenure 12.11 10.14 -.02 -.09 -.09 -.06 -.02 -.04 .00 -.14** .09 
14. Job number 1.54 2.21 -.10 -.06 -.10 .01 -.04 -.03 -.04 .08 -.19**
15. Education  1.57 1.25 .08 .28** .26** .24** .07 .10* .01 -.01 .24**
16. Years under supervision 3.05 3.01 -.12** -.14** -.14** -.12* -.08 -.11* -.03 .00 -.08 
** p < .01 
*   p < .05  
Note: Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Er inducement = Employee perception of employer 








Variables 6 6a 6b 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1.  Ee expectation           
2.  Er expectation           
2a.Er task expectation           
2b.Er context.  expectation           
3.  Ee obligation           
3a.Ee task obligation           
3b.Ee context. obligation           
4.  Intent to leave           
5.  Er obligation           
6.  Ee performance           
6a.Ee task performance .89**           
6b.Ee context. performance .90** .61**          
7.   Er inducement .26** .21** .24**  
8.   Generalized trust .25** .19** .25** .42**  
9.   Trust in supervisor .23** .17** .23** .61** .40**  
10. Gender -.06 -.06 -.04 -.11* .07 .01  
11. Marital status .13* .08 .15** .04 .02 -.01 .37**  
12. Age .14** .13* .13* -.01 -.04 .04 .04 .35** 
13. Tenure .15** .13** .14** -.03 -.02 .00 -.06 .30** .85**
14. Job number -.12* -.14** -.08 .11 -.07 -.02 -.12* .03 -.03 -.15**
15. Education  .15** .18** .09 .01 .08 .00 .23** -.01 -.12* -.16** -.18**






Means, Standard Deviations, and Adjusted Correlations at Individual Level (n = 394) 
Variables            Mean SD 1 2 2a 2b 3 4 4a 4b 5 6
1.  Ee expectation .00 .38 
2.  Ee obligation .00 .37 .42**
2a.Ee task obligation .00  
  
   
   
.42 .43** .90**
2b.Ee context. obligation .00 .41 .33** .89** .60**
3.  Intent to leave .00 .59 -.20** -.22** -.23** -.15**
4.  Ee performance .00 .36 .05 .17** .16** .14** -.19**
4a.Ee task performance .00 .38 .02 .14** .13** .11* -.17** .90**
4b.Ee context. performance .00 .41 .06 .17** .15** .15** -.18** .91** .65**
5.  Er inducement .00 .69 .14** .33** .29** .29** -.22** .27** .22** .27**
6.  Generalized trust .00 .59 .18** .33** .34** .25** -.19** .23** .24** .17** .33**
7.  Trust in supervisor .00    .66 .19** .37** .33** .34** -.35** .28** .24** .27** .58** .35**
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Er inducement = Employee perception of employer inducement; Ee performance =  








4.2 MODEL EVALUATION  
Path analysis describes modeling systems of sets of hypothesized structural 
relationships among observed variables (Kaplan, 2000).  It was used to analyze the 
Modified Exchange Models in Study 1.  Structural equation modeling using AMOS 
4.0 was performed in examining the Alternative Trust Model.   
Analyses on the Modified Exchanged Models are still based on the unadjusted 
raw data, since some variables in the Modified Exchanges Models are group level 
data (i.e., employer expectation and employer obligation), which equal to zero after 
adjusting group level effect through group-mean centering.  Path analysis works 
through traditional regression analysis.  Although regression analysis has the 
assumption that the data should be independent, it may produce less biased results 
compared with AMOS since the latter is a simultaneous estimate of the whole model 
while the former works step by step. 
 
4.2.1 Evaluation of the Modified Exchange Models 
4.2.1.1 Employer Influence on Employee  
The Employer Influence on Employee Sub-models were examined at both 
individual level and group level, as data provided by supervisors reflects group level 
information while data provided by employees reflects individual level information.  
Results of analyses at both levels of studies were reported.  
Employee task performance obligation and contextual performance obligation 
were separately studied.  Path analysis first was performed at the individual level on 
the sub-model studying employer influence on employee task performance obligation 
following Kline’s (1998) procedures.  At the first step, the direct effects on the 




endogenous variable in the first model in Figure 6 is employee perception of 
employer inducement.  It has only one predictor: employer obligation.  In a regression 
equation with employee perception of employer inducement as dependent variable 
and employer obligation as independent variable, the standardized path coefficient 
was calculated to be -.10 (p > .05).  This step was repeated for each of the remaining 
endogenous variables.  For the second endogenous variable in the path model, 
employee expectation, it has one predictor: employee perception of employer 
inducement.  For the third endogenous variable employer task performance obligation, 
it has two predictors: employee perception of employer inducement and employee 
expectation.  For the final endogenous variable employer perception of employee task 
performance, its predictor is employee task performance obligation. 
Table 11 
 Analysis of Modified Exchange Model (Employer Influence on Employee) at 
Unadjusted Individual Level (N=394 for employees and N=46 for employers) 
 
Criterion Predictors Standardized 
coefficients 
(S.E.) 





1. Er inducement Er obligation -.10 (.09) 3.73 .009 .007 .993 
2. Ee expectation Er inducement .21**(.03) 17.25 .042 .040 .960 
3. Ee task  Er inducement .31**(.03) 101.71 .342 .339 .661 
    obligation Ee expectation .43**(.05)     
4. Ee task  Ee task  .15**(.05) 8.60 .021 .019 .981 
    performance obligation      
 
Criterion Predictors Standardized 
coefficients 
(S.E.) 





1. Er inducement Er obligation -.10(.09) 3.73 .009 .007 .993 
2. Ee expectation  Er inducement .21**(.03) 17.25 .042 .040 .960 
3. Ee contextual  Er inducement .29**(.03) 54.93 .219 .215 .785 
    obligation Ee expectation .31**(.05)     
4. Ee contextual Ee contextual  .13**(.06) 6.86 .017 .015 .985 
    Performance  obligation      
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
Note: Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Ee task performance = Employer perception of 
employee task performance; Ee contextual performance = Employer perception of employee 






At the next step, the variances of the disturbances were calculated.  The squared 
multiple correlations (R2) and adjusted R2 were obtained from the multiple 
regressions in the last step.  Subtracting adjusted R2 from 1 (i.e., 1- adjusted R2) 
produces the proportions of unexplained variance. 
Figure 6 
Standardized Solution for Modified Exchange Model (Employer Influence 














































** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
 
Same procedures were followed while a
Employee Contextual Performance Obligation
Estimates of direct effects and disturbance va
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influence on employee task performance obligation and employer influence on 
employee contextual performance obligation) in Figure 6 are summarized in Table 11.  
Results of significant test are available only for the unstandardized regression 
coefficients (not shown in Table 11) but not for the standardized coefficients.  Those 
reported in Table 11 are the significance levels of unstandardized estimates which 
were used in path analysis to represent the significance levels of the standardized 
estimates. 
All values of the standardized solutions are presented in their appropriate places 
in the model in Figure 6.    
 
As predicted, employee perception of employer inducements is positively 
associated with task performance obligation (β = .31, p < .01) and contextual 
performance obligation (β = .29, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 1a-1 and 1a-2.  The 
results are in line with the norm of reciprocity.  
Also as predicted, employee expectation regarding employer inducement is 
positively associated with both task performance obligation (β = .43, p < .01) and 
contextual performance obligation (β = .31, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 2a-1 and 
2a-2.  The results are in line with social exchange theory.  Since there is also positive 
relationship between employee perception of employer inducement and employee 
expectation (β = .21, p < .01, in support of Hypothesis 4a), it is evident that employee 
perceived employer inducement has impact on employee task/contextual performance 
obligation by way of both direct and indirect relationships (indirectly through 
employee expectation).  
The hypothesized relationships regarding employee performance obligation and 




Hypothesis 3a-1 (task performance, β = .15, p < .01) and Hypothesis 3a-2 (contextual 
performance, β = .13, p < .01).  However, the relationship between employer 
obligation and employee perception of employer inducement are insignificant (β = -
.10, p > .05, not supporting Hypothesis 3b).  One reason may be that there is rarely 
appraisal system in any organization for employees to appraise employer inducement, 
while there are such formal systems in most organizations for employers to appraise 
employee performance.   
 
The Employer Influence on Employee Sub-Models were also examined at the 
group level (Table 12, Figure 7).   Aggregated employee data at the group level were 
entered in the regressions in path analysis. 
Table 12 
 Analysis of Modified Exchange Model (Employer Influence on Employee) at 
Unadjusted Group Level (N=46) 
Criterion  Predictors Standardized 
coefficients 
(S.E.) 




1. Er inducement Er obligation -.13(.13) .76 .017 -.005 1.000 
2. Ee expectation Er inducement .32*(.08) 4.89 .100 .079 .921 
3. Ee task  Er inducement .35**(.06) 20.47 .488 .464 .536 
    obligation Ee expectation .50**(.12)     
4. Ee task  Ee task  .16.(20) 1.19 .026 .004 .996 
    Performance  obligation      
 
Criterion  Predictors Standardized 
coefficients 
(S.E.) 




1. Er inducement Er obligation -.13(.13) .76 .017 -.005 1.000 
2. Ee expectation Er inducement .32*(.08) 4.89 .100 .079 .921 
3. Ee contextual  Er inducement .42**(.07) 7.17 .250 .215 .785 
    obligation Ee expectation .17(.13)     
4. Ee contextual Ee contextual  .14(.22) .82 .018 -.004 1.000 
    Performance  obligation      
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
Note: Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Ee task performance = Employer perception of 
employee task performance; Ee contextual performance = Employer perception of employee 





At group level, employee perception of employer inducements is still positively 
associated with task performance obligation (β = .35, p < .01) and contextual 
performance obligation (β = .42, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 1a-1 and 1a-2.  
Employee expectation regarding employer inducement is positively associated with 
task performance obligation (β = .50, p < .01, supporting Hypothesis 2a-1), however, 
has no significant association with contextual performance obligation (β = .17, p 
> .05, not supporting Hypothesis 2a-2).  Same as the results at the individual level, 
the relationship between employee perception of employer inducement and employee 
expectation (β = .32, p < .01, in support of Hypothesis 4a) are positively related. 
Figure 7 
  Standardized Solution for Modified Exchange Model (Employer Influence on 















































** p < .01; *   p < .05 
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The hypothesized relationships regarding employee task/contextual 
performance obligation and employer perception of employee task/contextual 
performance (task performance, β = .16, p > .05; contextual performance, β = .14, p 
> .05) and regarding employer obligation and employee perception of employer 
inducement (β = .13, p > .05) are not significant.  This may be due to the fact that 
both variables in each relationship are measuring individual-level information while 
the analyses are performed at the group level, and due to the small sample size 
(N=46).  
 
4.2.1.2 Employee Influence on Employer  
For the Employee Influence on Employer Sub-model, path analysis can not be 
carried out at the individual level since Employer Expectation and Employer 
Obligation these two non-exogenous variables are constant at the individual level.  As 
such, the model can only be tested at the group level. 
At the group level analysis (Table 13, Figure 8), all the hypothesized 
relationships are not significant except the one between employer expectation and 
employer obligation (β = .72, p < .01).     
Table 13 
Analysis of Modified Exchange Model (Employee Influence on Employer) at 
Unadjusted Group Level (N=46) 
 
Criterion Predictors Standardized 
coefficients 
(S.E.) 





1. Ee performance Ee obligation .12(.20) .62 .014 -.009 1.000 
2. Er  expectation Ee performance .16(.21) 1.15 .026 .003 .997 
3. Er obligation Ee performance .15(.17) 28.99 .574 .554 .446 
 Er expectation .72**(.13)     
3. Er inducement Er obligation -.13(.13) .76 .017 -.005 1.000 
** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
Note: Ee = Employee; Er = Employer; Ee performance = Employer perception of employee 
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** p < .01 
*   p < .05 
 
Path analysis result of Study 1 is mixed.  It reveals that at the indiv
most hypothesized relationships regarding employer influence on emplo
social exchange process are supported.  However, the corresponding
influence on employer can not be examined.   As to the result at group
unclear since the small group size in this research.   
Study 1 also reveals that further study should be conducted reg
motivation of employees to make contribution to their employers.  The
Influence on Employee Sub-model studied at the individual level explai
the variance on employee task obligation, 21.5% of the variance on
contextual obligation, 1.9% of the variance on employee task performance
on employee contextual performance.   It is expected that trust plays an im
in the employer – employee social exchange process.   
Based on the above arguments regarding the limitation of and indic
Study, Study 2 proceeds with a focus on trust in the employer inducement 
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4.2.2 Evaluation of the Alternative Trust Model 
Analyses on the Alternative Trust Model are all based on the group-mean 
centered data, because all the variables in the alternative model are measured at the 
individual level.  Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to test the posited 
relationships. 
 
Since Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation will be used in SEM, the adjusted 
data were first checked to see whether they are normally distributed.  For the data 
collected in this study, the Skewness of all the measured variables fell within the 
normal or moderately non-normal distribution of ±1 with Skewness ranging from -.52 
to .27 (Table 14), and the Kurtosis of all the measured variables fell within the more 
conservatively defined normal and moderately non-normal distribution range with 
kurtosis values ranging from -.13 to 1.14 (Benson & Fleishman, 1994; Chou & 
Bentler, 1995).  Therefore ML was an appropriate estimation technique to use in the 
data analysis.  ML has been shown to provide acceptable parameter estimates, 
goodness-of-fit measures, and standard error scores when data are normally or 
moderately non-normally distributed (Benson & Fleishman, 1994).   
Table 14 
The Skewness and Kurtosis of Employee Level Reflective Scales 
Scales Mean SD Skew Kur. 
Employee expectation .000 .378 -.37 .46 
Employee perception .000 .687 -.50 .82 
Employee task obligation .000 .423 -.34 -.13 
Employee contextual obligation .000 .409 -.16 .30 
Intent to leave .000 .589 .27 .65 
Propensity to trust .000 .587 -.52 1.14 





The Alternative Trust Model was thus tested using AMOS 4.0.  Task 
performance obligation, contextual performance obligation, and intent to leave these 
three types of employee behavior intentions key to organization effectiveness were 
studied separately in three sub-models.  Besides beta coefficients, goodness-of-fit 
indexes including chi-square, TLI, CFI, and RMSEA were also reported.    
Chi-square is a commonly used goodness-of-fit measure; a non-significant 
probability can indicate a good model fit.  But it is easily affected by sample size and 
is a reasonable measure of fit for models with about 75 to 200 cases (for big sample 
size, the probability of chi-square will tend to be significant).  It has also been 
suggested that a chi-square two or three times as large as the degrees of freedom is 
acceptable (Carmines & McIver, 1981).   
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Root Mean 
Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) are measures of goodness-of-fit which are 
independent of sample size.  TLI provides a measure of the percentage of covariance 
that is explained by the proposed model.  The closer the TLI value is to 1, the better 
the fit, while a value of .90 or above indicate adequate fit (Bentler & Bonett, 1980).  
CFI is interpreted as TLI.   CFI values of .90 or greater indicate acceptable level of fit.  
Both TLI and CFI measure the goodness of fit of data to the model, while RMSEA 
assesses the badness of fit of a proposed model.  Acceptable models have a RMSEA 
value of .08 or less. 
The beta coefficients, goodness-of-fit indexes, and variance explained, these 


































*   p < .05 
** p < .01 
Note: 
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Discussions of the Alternative Trust Models are therefore based on the results 
in Figure 12, 13, and 11.   
As predicted, employee expectations regarding employer inducements is 
positively associated with both task performance obligation (β = .52, p < .01) and 
contextual performance obligation (β = .34, p < .01), and negatively associated with 
intent to leave (β = -.21, p < .01), supporting Hypothesis 1a-1, 1a-2, and 1a-3.  The 
results are strongly in line with social exchange theory.   
However, employee perception of employer inducements is no longer 
significantly associated with task performance obligation (β = .09, p > .05), 
contextual performance obligation (β = .16, p > .05), and intent to leave (β = .03, p 
> .05) after trust variables (generalized trust and trust in supervisor) are entered into 
the model, failing to support Hypothesis 2a-1, 2a-2, and 2a-3.  It seems that the direct 
reciprocation does not work in the Alternative Trust Models.   
No relationship was found between employee perception of employer 
inducement and employee expectation (β = .10, p > .05 in Figure 12; β = .12, p > .10 
in Figure 12 and Figure 10), not in support of Hypothesis 3a.  The prediction that 
employee perception of employer inducement has indirect impact on employee 
task/contextual obligation and intent to leave by way of influencing employee 
expectation was therefore fail to get supported. 
Employee perception of employer inducements has strong impact on trust in 
supervisor (β = .60, p < .01, supporting Hypothesis 6), which is significantly 
associated with employee contextual obligation (β = .22, p < .01, supporting 
Hypothesis 5-2) and intent to leave (β = -.37, p < .01, supporting Hypothesis 5-3).  
These relationships indicate that employee perception of employer inducement has 




influencing employee trust in supervisor.  However, there is no significant 
relationship between trust in supervisor and employee task obligation (β = .13, p > .05, 
not supporting Hypothesis 5-1).  
As to generalized trust, it has impact on task obligation (β = .20, p < .01, in 
support of Hypothesis 7-1), but has no significant impact on contextual obligation (β 
= .04, p > .05, not in support of Hypothesis 7-2) and intent to leave (β = -.03, p > .05, 
failing to support Hypothesis 7-3).   
As predicted, generalized trust can influence employee trust in supervisor (β 
= .17, p < .01, supporting Hypothesis 8), employee expectations regarding 
organizational inducements (β = .21, p < .01, supporting Hypothesis 9), and the level 
of organizational inducements perceived by employees (β = .37, p < .01, supporting 
Hypothesis 10).    
There is no relationship between employee task performance obligation and 
employer perception of employee task performance (β = .06, p > .05), and between 
employee contextual performance obligation and employer perception of employee 
contextual performance (β = .05, p > .05).   Surprisingly, employer perception of 
employee task performance was found to be associated with generalized trust (β = .23, 
p < .01) and employer perception of employee contextual performance was found to 
be associated with employee perception of employer inducement (β = .20, p < .01), 









This chapter summarizes the main findings and implications of Study 1 and 
Study 2.  While admitting the limitations of both studies, directions on future research 
are suggested. 
 
5.1 MAIN FINDINGS 
The main findings of Study 1 are that, at least at the individual level, in the 
perceived employer inducement – employee obligation/contribution social exchange 
process, 1) employees’ expectation regarding inducement from employers can 
strongly predict employees’ obligation to make contribution; 2) employees’ 
perception of employers’ inducement can directly predict employees’ obligation to 
make contribution; 3) employees’ perception of employers’ inducement can indirectly 
predict employees’ obligation to make contribution by the way of employees’ 
expectation; 4) employees’ obligation to make contribution can predict employers’ 
perception of employees’ contribution, but employers’ obligation to make 
contribution can not predict employees’ perception of employers’ inducement.   
However, because corresponding test can not be applied on the employee contribution 
– employer inducement process, the bilateral exchange can not get examined in the 
current study.   
The main finding of Study 2 is that trust helps reciprocal social exchange to 
proceed.   
First it is found that trust in supervisor contributes to the reciprocal social 




between perceived inducements and trust in supervisor was supported; and trust in 
supervisor was found to be associated with increased employee contextual 
performance obligation and with reduced intent to leave.  These relationships reveal 
that perceived organizational inducements has an impact on employee contextual 
performance obligation and intent to leave by way of trust in supervisor.   
Second, generalized trust was found to have a strong direct relationship with 
the level of task performance obligation, and also indirect relationships with task 
performance obligation by way of employee expectation.  Whereas generalized trust 
has no direct relationships with the level of contextual performance obligation and 
intent to leave, it had indirect relationships with contextual performance obligation 
and intent to leave by way of trust in supervisor, and also by way of employee 
expectation.    
The role of trust is proved by this study to be especially important to overcome 
the ambiguities and uncertainties in the reciprocal social exchange between 
employers and employees.  The trust between two parties needs efforts from both 
parties.  At the employee side, employees’ trust in supervisor is based both on 
perceived employers’ inducements and employees’ own generalized trust.   
The context of this research is in China, where the employer – employee 
relationship is characterized as being threatened by more uncertainty and ambiguity 
(Bhattacharya, Devinney, & Pillutla, forthcoming; Child & Möllering, 2003).  The 
findings in this research suggest that trust is a salient factor in the reciprocal social 
exchange process between employers and employees. The obstacles in the reciprocal 
social exchange process can be overcome by relational trust (trust in supervisor) 







A dominant framework for studying the employer – employee relationship 
during the last 15 years relies on social exchange with an emphasis on the norm of 
reciprocity (Shore & Coyle-Shapiro, 2003).  This thesis follows this framework, and 
focuses on the role of trust in the reciprocal social exchange process. 
Compared with previous studies, this study found that although social exchange 
and the norm of reciprocity were frequently regarded as interdependent, in uncertain 
conditions, the norm of reciprocity can not be simply regarded as direct reciprocation.   
This study contributes in finding the multiple roles of trust in the social 
exchange process.  The introduction of trust in supervisor and generalized trust into 
the reciprocal social exchange, complements the shortages the norm of reciprocity has 
shown as a mechanism to maintain the continuousness of the exchange.   
In real organizational practice, this study tells us that in order to sustain 
reciprocal social exchange between employers and employees, it is effective to 
maintain trust between the parties.  In this process, both employers and employees 
contribute: employee perceived inducements from employers and employees with 
high generalized trust characters are both associated with a high level of trust in 
supervisor. 
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
For the Modified Exchange Models in Study 1, hypotheses were tested with 
group-level effect unadjusted.  There may be bias in the results since the data are not 
independent between each other.  Future research using multiple-level structural 




In Study 1 and 2, the reliability of the measure of employer inducement 
(involved variables include employee perception of employer inducement, employee 
expectation, and employer obligation) is a concern.  Future research needs to improve 
the measure of this construct.  
In Study 2, although this study examined the relationship between employee 
performance obligations and employer perception of employee performance, common 
method variance problem still exists in examining most of the hypotheses.  Although 
data from employers were also collected, it does not resolve the common method 
variance problem when testing relationships between individual level variables. 
However, this issue does not nullify this research’s efforts.   
Also in Study 2, although this study tried to and successfully proved the role of 
trust for the continuous reciprocal social exchange between employers and employees, 
it is from employee side only.  The roles of employers’ trust in subordinate and 
generalized trust in the employer side reciprocal social exchange process remained 
unknown.  Future research may need to explore the corresponding motivation 
mechanism on employer side, in order to explain the sustainable reciprocal social 
exchange between employers and employees. 
 
Finally, this thesis collected data from diverse industries and work units to 
achieve generalizability and robustness of research findings.  However, for the 
emerged group level, this research just partial off the group level effect through group 
mean centering and did not explore relationships across different levels.  For example, 
employee perception of employer inducement may explain some of the variance of 
employee performance obligations at the group level, while generalized trust may 
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Number of Persons in Each Group 
 
Group ID No. Group ID No. Group ID No. Group ID No. 
101 11 102 9 103 8 104 6 
105 7 201 9 202 10 203 9 
204 7 205 6 301 9 302 9 
303 9 304 6 401 11 402 11 
403 11 404 11 405 10 501 7 
502 10 503 9 504 9 505 8 
506 11 507 3 601 8 602 7 
603 8 604 3 605 3 701 10 
702 12 703 12 704 8 705 13 
801 7 802 5 803 8 804 7 
805 6 901 11 902 9 903 11 






Inter-item Correlations for Pilot Data 
Task Performance 
 
 B3T B5T B7T B8T B10T B11T B14T 
B3T        
B5T .458       
B7T .261 .372      
B8T .287 .275 .545     
B10T .301 .259 .346 .401    
B11T .354 .465 .365 .240 .487   




 B1C B2C B4C B6C B9C B12C B13C 
B1C        
B2C .164       
B4C .352 .115      
B6C .283 .046 .361     
B9C .476 .169 .249 .500    
B12C .368 .199 .318 .548 .437   
B13C .321 .314 .574 .330 .374 .546  
 
Intent to Leave 
 
 C2I C5I C7IR C12I C17I C22I 
C2I       
C5I .564      
C7IR .295 .262     
C12I .372 .688 .255    
C17I .502 .587 .384 .472   








 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7R D8R D9R D10R
D1           
D2 .819          
D3 .725 .674         
D4 .424 .457 .386        
D5 .286 .305 .225 .743       
D6 .231 .176 .167 .537 .580      
D7R .523 .574 .356 .449 .455 .294     
D8R .357 .394 .402 .323 .225 .046 .562    
D9R .495 .515 .494 .339 .270 .145 .550 .634   




Trust in Supervisor 
 
 C3T C8T C10TR C13T C15TR C18T C20TR 
C3T        
C8T .742       
C10TR .681 .704      
C13T .610 .668 .631     
C15TR .397 .612 .635 .612    
C18T .756 .736 .583 .575 .513   
C20TR .647 .653 .595 .508 .497 .591  
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